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Abstract 
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It also discusses how four factorsquality races, marginal revenues equalling marginal profits, the 
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assesses the success or failure of British industrial policy towards media industries. The paper observes 
media’s impact on the aggregate economy through opportunity costs, expectations and aspirations, the 
functioning of the market, education, and, finally, through shaping the means of institutional change.  
In addition, the paper makes new decennial benchmark estimates for British consumer expenditure on 
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1. Introduction 
The Olympic Games in London in the summer of 2012 stood at the end of a 
long twentieth century in which the British economy changed from a 
manufacturing stalwart into a major exporter of services. The opening and 
closing ceremonies stood in remarkable contrast. The former related a story in 
which the industrial revolution and the welfare state figured heavily, the latter 
focused exclusively on music, Britain’s foremost cultural export. In public 
perception, then, the British comparative advantage had little to do anymore 
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with manufacturing. Instead, the ceremony closed a twentieth century in which 
Britain benefited from a distinctive capability in media and entertainment. In 
the public mind the music industry’s importance was far larger than its limited 
GDP-share suggested. 
Media can be seen as an infrastructure industry such as electricity or 
transport. Through information transmission, they helped markets exist and 
function; through the conditioning of morals and empathy they reduced 
transaction costs; through advertising they revolutionised the market structure 
of consumer goods industries; through educational materials they increased 
human capital; through the formation of expectations they increased citizens’ 
aspirations; and, finally, they facilitated knowledge exchange and collective 
action that could kick-start institutional change, as has become evident so 
recently in the Arab spring. A contemporary economic historian might exclaim 
that media are everywhere except in the economic history literature, not unlike 
Briggs’ (1960: 38-61) remark that “The provision of entertainment has never 
been a subject of great interest either to economists or economic historians—
at least in their working hours”.  
This chapter examines three questions. First, we investigate how new 
media industries have arisen in Britain since 1870 and how we can 
conceptualise their emergence. Second, we explore what tendencies 
influenced the long-run evolution of each of these industries. Third, we assess 
the impact they had on the rest of the economy. 
These questions are worthwhile because it is likely that Britain 
traditionally had a comparative advantage in entertainment production that it 
could never fully exploit internationally. After 1870, however, a series of 
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technological revolutions made media products increasingly tradeable and  
allowed Britain to capitalise on its comparative advantage. In the 140 years 
since then, few other industries have been turned upside down so often by 
new technologies. Yet almost all old media industries survived in new forms, 
unlike manufacturing industries such as textiles, coal-mining or steel. Media 
industries formed the capstone of the British economy, with an impact far 
larger than their GDP-share suggested. 
 This chapter develops a conceptual framework and analyses the 
dynamics of media industries, identifying long-run tendencies. It does not 
provide a descriptive history of all media industries in Britain since 1870, for 
which many other works can be consulted. Some industries, therefore, will be 
treated more equally than others. 
 We will first analyse the emergence of new media technologies in the 
framework of an industrialisation hypothesis, then descend to the within-
industry level and identify four tendencies that affected the internal evolution 
of particular media industries. Subsequently we discuss the impact of the 
media industries on the rest of the economy, and finally we assess the role of 
policy. 
Though the music at the end of the Games seemed far removed from 
the industrial revolution depicted at their start, British entertainment 
experienced an industrial revolution of its own from about 1890, which led to 
the industrialisation of entertainment. With this revolution, our journey begins. 
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2. Industrialisation: the thief in the night 
Sixty special trains filled with actors, actresses, stage hands, carpenters, 
promoters, their entourage and accompanying props and scenery, sped over 
the railways across Britain on a normal Sunday evening in 1870, on their way 
to their next venue. Britain had a large number of theatres, and almost every 
month a new large music hall opened somewhere. Consumers could enjoy 
the more vulgar entertainment in cider cellars and penny gaffs, go to the horse 
races, buy one of the many daily editions of a newspaper from a street 
vendor, borrow a book from a library, or embark on an interactive game, for 
example a board game or a game of cards with friends in a pub.  
 Rising real wages, falling working hours, population growth and the rise 
in literacy and education increased demand for media and entertainment 
further, while increasing urbanisation and better urban transport networks 
transformed more of this demand in consumption by concentrating it spatially. 
This boosted the growth of the existing media industries further in the years 
between 1870 and 1900. Around 1900, theatre and music hall circuits had 
arisen in almost every part of the country, newspapers were all-around, and 
new printing methods spread them even further and added more drawings 
and photographs. Magazines became a new growth industry for a Britain that 
was becoming more literate by the day. 
Initially the demand was transformed into consumption using traditional 
technologies, for example through music hall and theatre circuits and high-
capacity venues with differentiated prices (Bakker 2012a). Ever more persons 
were needed to work in the media and entertainment industries. The case of 
spectator entertainment shows how this created bottlenecks that, by the end 
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of the nineteenth century, triggered a process of industrialisation, in which 
entertainment was automated, standardised and made tradeable (Bakker 
2008). Before this period, producers and consumers needed to be at the 
same place and time, and there was always uncertainty about the timely 
arrival and fitness of cast and sets. Following the adoption of cinema, the 
performance was replaced by moving images, consumers were guaranteed a 
performance of standard quality, and actors could perform at infinitely many 
places at the same time. Similar industrialisations would follow with recorded 
music, radio, television, videogames and the internet. New technologies also 
improved the productivity of traditional media, such as the amplification of 
stadium-scaled concerts and the televising of live performances. Each of 
these industrialisations came as a thief in the night. They were hardly noticed 
by economists at the time or economic historians afterwards, and met little 
Luddite resistance of the kind that had happened during the industrialisations 
of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
 A comparative estimate of productivity growth in spectator 
entertainment for Britain, France and the United States between 1900 and 
1938 suggests that British live entertainment was already highly productive in 
1900, with an output per hour of labour several times that of the US and 
France (Bakker 2008). Nevertheless, between 1900 and 1938 output 
measured in spectator-hours kept growing at 3.2 % a year, and about a third 
of this, 1.1 %, happened without any increase in inputs and thus was caused 
by the growth of Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP-growth was several 
times lower than in France and America. Given the high initial British 
productivity level, this is not that surprising. It is not inconsistent with the idea 
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that Britain had a hidden comparative advantage in media and entertainment 
that it could exploit once they became more tradeable. 
The number of actors per capita increased sharply in the industrialising 
parts of Britain (Sanderson 1984), suggesting that Britain’s comparative 
advantage, beside relative freedom and early media deregulation, was at least 
partially shaped by its early industrialisation, rapid urbanisation, and large 
market size. But because much of entertainment and media was not fully 
tradeable, this advantage remained partially hidden, and probably only could 
express itself in book exports and the trading of information (Bakker 2011a). 
In the early 1850s, for example, book exports were about seven times book 
imports.1 In the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, the first two of 
a series of technologies that would make media and entertainment tradeable, 
the phonograph and the cinematograph, were commercialised. Once music 
and film thus had become tradeable, Britain could make more use of its 
comparative advantage. 
The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of British tradable 
entertainment products—their share in British exports over the worldwide 
industry’s share in global exports—increased substantially during the first half 
of the twentieth century. Work by Crafts (1989) shows that the RCA for 
tradable entertainment productsin a category called ‘Book and Film’ that 
comprises most media products, including books, magazines, and records  
but also some other products (Table 1)ranked 14th and 13th out of 16 
industry groups in 1899 and 1913— ahead of only bricks and glass, wood and 
leather, and non-ferrous metals, while in Germany ‘Book and Film’ was the 
                                                 
1 U.K. Parliamentary Papers, 1852 (196), vol. 28, pt. 1, as quoted in Temin (1997: 75-7). See also Weedon (2003) and the section ‘The case of publishing’, 
below. 
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Table 1. Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) rankings of the tradable entertainment sector for 
selected countries, 1899-1950
1899 1913 1929 1937 1950
Britain 14 13 6 8 10 8 4
United States 13 10 6 7 6 7 7
Japan 10 8 5 4 6 5 4
Belgium 13 13 14 10 8 -1 5
Switzerland 8 10 9 8 8 -1 0
Italy 6 6 8 7 6 -2 0
India 6 7 8 6 6 -2 0
Germany 1 2 3 4 3 -2 -2
Sweden 10 11 12 13 13 -2 -3
Canada 4 8 8 8 11 -4 -7
France 3 4 10 3 6 -7 -3
Notes : RCA = revealed comparative advantage, which is the British industry's share in British exports over the global industry's 
share in global exports. The countries are ranked by the growth of their RCA in tradable entertainment between 1899 and 1929.
Tradable entertainment products are labelled 'Book and Film' by Crafts, and comprise the following: 'books, periodicals
and all printed matter, agendas, notebooks and boxed stationery, pens, pencils, toys, games and sports goods, gramophones, 
musical instruments, cameras, optical instruments, films and photographic paper, paintings and works of art.'
The table shows the RCA rank of 'Book and Film' within 16 manufacturing industry groups that comprised 'Iron and steel, 
non-ferrous metals, chemicals, bricks and glass, wood and leather, industrial equipment, electricals, agricultural equipment, 
rail and ship, cars and aircraft, alocohol and tobacco, textiles, apparel, metal manufactures, and fancy goods.'
The first number, 14, for example, shows that 'Book and Film' had an RCA that ranked 14 within the 16 British manufacturing 
sectors in 1899.
Source : calculated from Crafts 1989: 130-131.
Rank of tradable entertainment products    Change
1899-1929 1899-1950
 
 
 top performing sector. Between 1899 and 1929, however, Book and Film’s 
RCA in Britain increased rapidly, by 8 ranks, suggesting that the increasing 
tradability of entertainment benefited the British entertainment industry, and 
also the American one. Only Japan showed also an increase in entertainment 
RCA during this period. In Germany, France, Sweden, and Canada the RCA 
of tradable entertainment declined substantially.  
By 1937 the British ranking was still 8th out of 16, ahead of industries 
such as iron and steel, cars and aircraft, and chemicals. Of the 16 groups, 
only ‘fancy goods’ experienced a similar improvement in its comparative 
advantage. In the US, ’Book and Film’ ranked 13th and 10th out of 16 in 1899 
and 1913 and had increased to 7th out of 16 by 1937. An obvious advantage 
of the US was its large domestic market size and less class-fragmented 
entertainment tastes. In absolute terms, however, German RCA in tradable 
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entertainment remained the highest of all countries throughout the period, 
except for 1937 (Table 1). France, India, and Japan held a surprisingly high 
RCA in tradable entertainment, in many years higher than the USA, though by 
1950 their rank had become the same as that of the USA and higher than that 
of Britain. Yet the high degree of aggregation and the inclusion of several non-
entertainment products leaves a high degree of uncertainty and makes 
precise conclusions difficult. 
 It is not easy to measure the effect of productivity changes in media 
between 1870 and 2010, because media output is not  always readily 
measurable, and changing census classifications for those working in media 
and creative industries make inputs also hard to measure in the long run.  
The number of actors, however, was recorded in all censuses until 
1991 and therefore might be a good long-run indicator that broadly reflects the 
direction of long-run changes in productivity in the media and entertainment 
industries.2 Figure 1 shows that the number of actors and actresses per million 
inhabitants increased sharply between 1881 and 1911, and after that declined 
gradually, while media and entertainment output increased enormously. The 
decline between 1931 and 1951, from 446 to 404 per million inhabitants, was 
an understatement, as the 1951 census category ‘Actors’ contained many 
occupations that in 1931 were grouped under ‘Other occupations’ in 
‘Entertainments and sport’, such as, for example, aerialists, clairvoyantes, 
equestrian artistes, jugglers, lion tamers, magicians, Professors of 
Legerdemain, snake charmers and wizards (Census of Population 1951:112; 
Census of Population 1931:96). 
                                                 
2 For an analytical history of acting see Sanderson (1984). For a detailed demography of actors in the nineteenth century see also Davis (1990, 2000). 
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Figure 1. Actors and actresses in England and Wales, number, number per million 
inhabitants, and number per £100 billion of real GDP, 1871-1991. 
 
Note: from 1971 the census classification became more aggregate than just ‘Actors’ and 
adjustment have been made. The left axis shows the number. RGDP stands for the number 
of actors and actresses per hundred billion pounds of real GDP. 
Sources:  1871-1951: Census of Population, category ‘Actors’. 1971: Census of Population 
1971, subtracting the 1981 fraction of musicians in the aggregate, and taking only the self-
employed without employees from the aggregate category. 1981 and 1991: the ‘self-
employed without employees’ in the industries ‘Film production, distribution and exhibition’ 
and ‘Radio and television services, theatres, etc.’ have been taken as an upper bound for the 
number of actors. The dotted line shows the 1981 and 1991 estimates using the same 
estimation steps as in 1971, but on an aggregate that is different from the 1971 aggregate.  
 
 
Between 1951 and 1971 the fall was even more rapid, suggesting that 
television automated away the remaining live entertainment. The 1971 
estimate is again an upper bound as entertainers, stage managers and 
musicians were now also included (a subtraction has been made for 
musicians, using 1981 proportions). After 1971, measurement becomes 
slightly problematic, as singers were now also grouped under actors, but 
musicians were listed separately. Therefore, the number of self-employed 
persons without employees in the film industry and in ‘radio, television, 
theatre, etc.’ has been used as an upper bound for the number of actors after 
Soft power: the media industries in Britain since 1870,ch. Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Gerben Bakker, LSE, 19-12-2013, p. 13 of 54 
 13
1971. These numbers suggest a further drop in the number of actors between 
1971 and 1991. 
Although we have to be careful when looking at exact levels, it remains 
clear that in the long run, actresses and actors declined substantially relative 
to population and GDP. Actors declined from about 500 per million inhabitants 
in 1911 to about 200 in 1991. If we assume that the quantity and quality of 
media consumed per capita remained constant (which it didn’t), and that the 
education level of the entertainers remained constant, then labour productivity 
increased between 0.6 to 1.2 % a year for 80 years for these actors. This 
growth rate might of course hide a big growth in supporting personnel and 
capital, yet it gives us a rare peak into the economics of superstars. 
Never have there been so many actors in existence as in 1911. The 
number per £100 billion of real GDP shows a similar movement, but peaked in 
1921 rather than 1911, and showed a very steady decline. Whereas in 1921 
Britain counted well over a hundred actors per billion of real GDP, by 1991, 
after a series of forgotten industrialisations, this had fallen to just twenty actors 
per billion. 
Baumol and Bowen (1966) and Baumol (1967) argued that some 
industries, such as personal services, are inherently technologically stagnant 
and will show hardly any productivity growth and take up an increasing output 
share. The evidence of the case of media and entertainment shows that 
personal services do not need to be inherently technologically stagnant, but 
that in the long-run declining productivity growth can trigger an 
industrialisation process that does away with some of the personal service 
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aspects and increases the degree of non-rivalrousness of the service.3 In 
addition, the fact that old media industries kept existing, suggests that they 
were not stagnant, but dynamically differentiated themselves, adopted many 
process innovations and were able to change their capital/labour ratios in the 
face of competition by new media technologies (Bakker 2012c). 
We have seen how new technologies can industrialise entire media 
industries. In the next section we will look inside these industries and 
investigate how their internal organisation and industrial structure could 
change over time. 
 
 
3. Industry structure: four economic tendencies 
Since 1870 the evolution of media industries has been dominated by four 
economic tendencies (Figure 2). The first was the importance of fixed and 
sunk costs relative to marginal costs, which affected the evolution of industry 
structure in media industries. Costs were sunk when one needed to incur 
them for entry but could not recover them on exit. Examples were the cost of 
producing a film, a record or a videogame. Sunk costs were endogenous 
when the entrepreneur could decide the level: one could decide to shoot a film 
for £100,000 or for £10 million. In some media industries, where it was 
relatively ‘cheap’ to improve quality, and in which consumers were sensitive to 
increased quality, quality races took place between firms, in which they 
escalated their sunk expenditure, hoping for disproportionately more revenues 
and profits. As a result, the industry structure often changed from highly  
                                                 
3 Nonrivalrousness is the extent to which one person consuming the good does not take away the quantity available to another person. See section3, pp. 15-
16. 
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Figure 2.  Economic tendencies in the development of media and creative industries. 
Economic characteristic Dynamic implication Historical expressions 
Sunk costs Quality race Motion pictures 1910s and 
1970s-1980s; Music industry 
1950s-1960s; Videogames 
2000s 
Marginal revenue = marginal 
profits 
Vertical integration Motion pictures 1900s-1910s 
Music: 1900s; 1960s 
Videogames: 2000s 
Toll good character 
(nonrivalrous but excludable) 
Exclusion-focused business 
models 
Income inequality (superstars)
All media and entertainment 
industries 
Project-based character Agglomeration Publishing 
Film industry 1910s-1920s 
Music industry 
Radio and television 
Source: adapted from Bakker (2005, 2008, 2010, 2014). 
 
fragmented to highly concentrated, with a few firms having very large market 
shares (Bakker 2014a; Sutton 1998).  
In the film industry during the 1910s, for example, the emerging 
Hollywood studios started just such an escalation race when they stepped up 
their outlays on the feature film, then a novelty.4 William Fox, for example, 
backed by a group of venture capitalists, increased his production outlays 
twentyfold in one single year (Bakker 2005, 2012b). Many entrepreneurs did 
not survive these gambles, and those that survived would become the five big 
and three smaller Hollywood studios that remained in business for much of 
the rest of the twentieth century. British film companies lost out, and by late 
1924 almost no film was produced in Britain anymore. A second quality race, 
again starting in Hollywood, but now in the 1970s, with the release of Jaws in 
1975, would eventually seriously constrain a recovering British film production 
industry, and by 1981, almost sixty years after Britain’s disastrous suffering 
                                                 
4 Under certain assumptions a big budget film can earn distributors five times more in cinema rentals than a film with half the production costs where both 
films compete for screen-time (Bakker 2004). 
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under the first quality race, the lowest number of British films since 1924 was 
made. 
 From the mid-1950s a quality race took place in music, in which 
emerging multinationals spent heavily on building large portfolios of artists and 
repertoire, on increasing the perceived quality of sound recordings, and on 
marketing and advertising. The rewards for getting it right were rising. In the 
US market, for example, average real revenues per new music copyright 
increased over 8 % per year in the fifteen years between 1955 and 1970 
(Bakker 2011b). The British multinational EMI became a long-term survivor of 
this race and by 1980 had become one of the six global multinationals 
dominating international music production and distribution. 
 In videogames, since the 1990s, similar quality races have taken place, 
albeit that the picture was made more complicated by battles between 
different, incompatible gaming platforms. Britain had several large companies 
participating in the sharp increase in spending, but in the end they all lost out 
or were taken over by Japanese and American competitors (Bakker 2010a). 
Nevertheless, today Britain still has a significant industry of videogame 
production companies which often work under contract to the large 
multinationals. 
 The second economic tendency was that in the media and creative 
industries, marginal costs were often so low that marginal revenues largely 
equalled marginal profits. An additional chair filled in a cinema, an additional 
record sold, an additional viewer to a television programme increased 
marginal cost only by a very small amount, meaning that a large part of the 
additional revenue was gross profits (Bakker 2003). Given this fact, vertical 
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integration was often an optimal solution, as it gave an incentive to producers 
to increase the revenue-generating capacity of media products; they would 
share in the increased marginal revenues because of marginal changes in 
product quality. 
 The quality race in the film industry, for example, happened after selling 
of films was replaced by renting films to distributors and then to cinemas, and 
during the quality race producers integrated with distributors and started to 
build cinema chains, while for big cinemas increasingly percentage-based 
rental contracts replaced fixed fees. In the music industry, the early twentieth 
century record producers, such as the Gramophone Company, the Victor 
Talking Machine Company, Pathé, Gaumont and Carl Lindstrom, almost all 
had their own factories and distribution, and the same held in the decades 
after the Second World War.  
 Newspaper owners generally owned their presses, broadcasters their 
channels and some in-house production units, and videogame producers 
were often part-owned by distributors or had some percentage-based 
contracts, though they appear to have been less prevalent than in the film 
industry. Less vertical integration happened in books and in magazines. 
Besides stimulating vertical integration, standard industrial organisation 
theory suggests that constant or falling marginal costs led to an excessive 
number of firms. Together with low exogenous sunk costs this had led to an 
enormous variety of media products and a dual market structure. In motion 
pictures, for example, the competitive escalation of endogenous sunk costs in 
quality races led to a vertically differentiated, highly concentrated market for 
big-budget Hollywood films, while low exogenous sunk costs and low marginal 
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costs led to excessive entry and a second, separate, fragmented market with 
an almost infinite variety of films, each having a very small market share 
(Bakker 2004).5 The latter market appears characterised by monopolistic 
competition: price is above the competitive level, but firms do not make long-
run economic profits (Chamberlin 1933; Robinson 1933). This dual market 
structure characterised several media industries in Britain, such as film and 
recorded music production and publishing. 
The third economic tendency was that most media and creative 
industries made products with a strong quasi-public good character: they were 
nonrivalrous but excludable. A product is nonrivalrous, sometimes also called 
nondiminishable, if one person consuming the good does not take away the 
quantity available to another person. One additional person ‘consuming’ 
national defence, for example, does not decrease the quantity available to 
others, while one additional person consuming bread does so. Pure public 
goods, such as national defence, are both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable 
and pure private goods, such as bread, are both rivalrous and excludable. In 
practice, rivalrousness and excludability are often a matter of degree, and 
quasi-public goods can be further divided into rivalrous but excludable goods, 
called common pool resources, such as fishing grounds or natural water 
systems, and non-rivalrous but excludable goods, called toll goods, such as 
private clubs, day-care centres or theatres (Ostrom 2010).  
Some technical inputs to the media industry, such as broadcasting 
spectra, could be characterised as common pool resources, but most media 
outputs were toll goods. Until a cinema was filled to capacity, for example, one 
                                                 
5 Mezias and Mezias (2000) borrow the term resource partitioning from biology to study phenomena not unlike both dynamic product differentiation and dual 
market structure discussed here. 
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person watching a movie did not prevent another person watching the same 
movie, and one person subscribing to a cable channel did not diminish the 
subscription opportunity to other consumers. This non-rivalrousness, 
combined with the possibility to exclude consumers, led to the adoption of 
business models that focused on the point of exclusion. Theatres, for 
example, could prohibit entry and thus charge ticket prices, printed and 
recorded media could sell physical products protected by copyright, and the 
early broadcasters could exclude advertisers from the airwaves and thus get 
their revenue from them. Stars also were able to extract rents, with superstars 
earning very high fees (Bakker 2001). Our statistics about actors suggest that, 
at the very least, the number of actors did not increase after 1911, suggesting 
that since then fewer professional actors have existed, with amongst them just 
a few superstars who made large earnings. 
The fourth economic tendency consisted of path-dependent 
agglomeration effects. Media industries often formed industrial districts in 
which they benefited from external economies of scale, a thick market for 
inputs and knowledge spill-overs. The benefits could happen within industries 
(Marshall-externalities) and between different media industries (Jacobs 
externalities). In Britain both type of agglomeration externalities were 
important. Some industries, such as news agencies, the music industry, the 
film industry and broadcasting located in and around London, and also 
benefited from each others’ close presence. Other media creative industries 
were slightly more dispersed, though with a strong presence in London. 
Videogame production, for example, was far more spread-out across Britain 
than film or music production.  
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3.1 Dominant firms 
Perhaps shaped by the four tendencies, in the British media industries 
dominant firms, sometimes near-monopolies, played a big role. In 
international news supply for example, around 1870 the Reuters news agency 
formed a cartel with the other big international agencies (Havas, AP and 
Wolff-Continental) and almost monopolised the market supply of international 
news in Britain. Its position became even more dominant when it merged with 
the Press Association in the 1920s (Silberstein-Loeb 2009; Bakker 2011a).  
In music, the Gramophone Company held an extraordinarily large 
market share and had become one of the largest employers in Britain by the 
late 1900s, and also a large multinational. Through its merger with the 
Columbia Gramophone Company to form Electrical and Musical Industries 
(EMI) in 1931, it gained a near-monopoly on the British market, its market 
share fluctuating between fifty and eighty percent (Bakker 2010a). It was 
briefly challenged by the new entrant Decca in the 1930s, which pioneered the 
juke box and the saturation-selling of low-priced records by expensive 
superstars. During the war, however, the government forced Decca to sell its 
US subsidiary, and Decca never regained its former pre-eminence. It was only 
in the 1960s, with the entry of foreign companies such as Philips/PolyGram, 
CBS Records and Warner Records on the British market, that EMI’s monopoly 
position started a slow but gradual decline. 
In film, during the 1930s the flour magnate J. Arthur Rank started 
buying up film distributors, producers and cinema chains, as well as a 25 
percent stake in the Hollywood studio Universal; in the 1940s, his firm had 
become larger than any Hollywood studio and dominated film production, 
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distribution and exhibition in Britain. Given the collusion of the Hollywood 
studios during the 1930s and 1940s, of which they were finally found guilty in 
1948, it is difficult to emphasize the adverse effects of Rank’s near-monopoly, 
as it might have counteracted the Hollywood collusion. Yet in the US market 
there still was some degree of rivalry between the eight Hollywood studios, 
and after the enforcement of competition policy by the US Supreme Court 
there still were eight independent organisations that could start to compete. 
In national newspapers, some companies held large shares, but limits 
to those shares, regular entry and exit, and the constraints on the behaviour of 
individual firms prevented the rise of single large near-monopolies. Magnates 
like Lord Northcliffe, Lord Beaverbrook or Rupert Murdoch never dominated 
newspapers as Reuters, Rank, EMI or the BBC dominated their own 
industries. Likewise, in book publishing several large publishers emerged, but 
no firm held a near-monopoly.6 
 
 
3.2 Advertising 
An important part of the business model of many media industries was 
advertising. For newspapers and magazines it was an important source of 
revenue, without which they could not continue in their existing forms. For 
cinemas, advertising constituted some significant ancillary revenue, and for 
commercial radio and television they were the main source of revenue until 
the coming of subscription television channels. Besides, producers of films, 
radio and television programmes and videogames often had significant 
additional revenues through product placement. 
                                                 
6 For a survey on industrial concentration in the American media see Noam (2009). 
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Figure 3. Total advertising spending in Britain, 1870-2010, in million pounds of 2010 and in 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Notes: Television advertising expenditure is included in total national advertising spending. 
The BBC license fee income is not, but has been included as the concomitant media 
production will not be reflected in the advertising statistics. 
Sources: calculated from Nevett (1982); Fletcher (2008); Ofcom.    
 
 
An expert estimate based on advertising tax revenues suggests that around 
1850, about £1m, or 0.2 % of GDP, was spent on advertising, the bulk of it 
going to newspapers (Nevett 1982). By 1907 this had grown enormously, to 
£12m, or 0.6 % of GDP, a real growth of 4.2 % per year for almost sixty years. 
This was the age in which many big brands were launched and entrepreneurs 
boldly pioneered the effects of massive marketing campaigns. 
 From 1907 until the First World War, real expenditure kept growing 
sharply, at 3.3 % per year (Figure 3).  By 1920, expenditure had fallen 
sharply, but then from 1920 to 1928 it started to grow phenomenally at 9.2 % 
per year, reaching a peak in 1935. In 1938, the closest year for which reliable 
disaggregated data is available, 55 % (£42m current) of all advertising 
expenditure went to newspapers and magazines, 13 % to direct mail, 8 % to 
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outdoor advertising, 7 % to window displays, 2 % to radio, and 1 % to cinema. 
The remaining 13 % was spent on advertising departments, agencies fees 
and miscellaneous categories.7 According to an independent estimate, radio 
advertising had grown from almost nothing in 1933 to about £0.8 million in 
1935, and £1.7 million in 1938, a real growth of 25 % per annum (National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1946). Given the British penchant 
for monopoly at the time, all expenditure was made on Radios Luxembourg, 
Normandy, Paris, Lyon and Toulouse, which were widely listened to in the UK. 
The 1935 peak would only be equalled again in 1954. Between 1948 
and 1960 there was very sharp growth, of 7.9 % per year, possibly brought 
about by increases in radio advertising and the emergence of television 
advertising. Between 1975 and 1989 a new growth spurt took place, with a 6.6 
% real growth per annum. In terms of GDP-share, advertising reached its 
highest share, 1.5 %, in 1989. Over the whole period 1870-2010, real 
advertising expenditure grew with 3.1 % per annum. Between 2000 and 2010, 
internet-based advertising grew from almost nothing to 26 percent of 
expenditure. 
The growth figures hide a phenomenal growth in real market size: the 
advertising market in 2010 was about 80 times the advertising revenue in 
1870, and 200 times the 1850 revenue–showing that also on this side market 
size had increased enormously; this was very relevant for media industries, as 
most of their costs were fixed and sunk, and marginal costs were low. Many 
technologies that were used in 2010 might not have been viable, ceteris 
paribus, in 1850, because the limited market size did not warrant the high 
fixed and sunk costs involved (Bakker 2013). The same underlying pattern is 
                                                 
7 Estimates for 1935 show a very similar disaggregation, except for a much lower share for radio of 0.4 % (Kaldor and Silverman, 1948). 
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visible in the growth of particular media industries, and this is what we are 
going to investigate in the next section. 
 
 
4. Creative destruction: emergence, growth and decline of British media 
industries  
Comparing several media industries over different intervals shows that growth 
rates ranged from 1.3 % per year for cinema to 11.4 % annually for 
videogames (Table 2). Broadcasting appears to have been the fastest 
growing industry in the long-run, on average growing 2.3 times faster than 
GDP for 80 years. When comparing GDP-shares, it becomes apparent that 
most industries went through a phase of growth, peak and relative decline 
(Table 2). Actors per capita peaked in 1911, when the GDP-share of spectator 
entertainment was one percent, newspapers during the First World War, when 
their share was 0.8 %. The largest share ever was that of spectator 
entertainment in 1946, on which was spent almost 2 % of GDP. Never after 
would so much be spent on a single category. GDP-shares could decline for 
many different reasons: the industry could become so productive that its 
prices dropped significantly, people could turn to other media, or GDP could 
grow faster. 
The absolute market sizes at the peak GDP-shares are also telling. 
When recorded music peaked in 1974, it was still smaller than spectator 
entertainment in 1911, despite population and GDP-growth. At its peak GDP-
share in 1992, the market for books was just one and half times that for 
spectator entertainment eighty years earlier.  
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Table 2. Estimated real market size and GDP-share of selected media industries in Britain, 1870-2010.   
 Real market size (£million of 2010) GDP
  Publishing  
Theatrical 
entertainment Recorded Broad- Video- £billion
  Advertising All Books Newspapers  All Cinema music casting games (2010)
1870 200  (75)        79
1880 310  (90)   990     95
1890 470 640 (140)   1,310     120
1900 730 1,260 210 700  1,650  (28)   160
1910 1,070 1,550 230 870  1,760 (270) (50)   170
1920 970 1,700 290 900  1,760 (810) (74) 3  190
1930 2,610 2,970 420 1,660  3,000 (2120) 250 76  230
1938 2,930 3,190 480 1,780  3,230 2,070 53 210  270
1950 2,730 3,850    4,730 2,810 150 340  360
1960 5,800 4,510 950 2,410  3,360 1,140 440 990  470
1970 6,680 5,550 1,080 3,130   710 780 2,360  620
1980 8,570 5,990 1,530    450 1,430 2,680 80 780
1990 14,090 8,290 2,510 3,880   330 2,370 5,680 340 1,010
2000 18,380 8,000 2,630 3,520   770 2,690 10,240 1,230 1,280
2010 15,680 7,000 2,200    990 1,240 11,700 1,980 1,460
            
Interval 1870-2010 1890-
2000
1870-
2010
1900-2000 1880-
1960
1910-
2010
1900-
2010
1930-
2010
1980-
2008
1870-
2010
Peak year 1989 1932 1993 1916 1946 1946 1974 2010 2008 2007
Length (years) 140 110 140 100 80 100 110 80 28 140
   
St/So 79 13 29 5 3 4 44 154 25 18
            
CAGR (%) 3.1 2.3 2.4 1.6  1.5 1.3 2.0 6.3 11.4  
GDP-growth 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  2.0 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1
CAGR/GDPgrowth 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8  0.8 0.6 0.8 2.7 4.9   
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Table 2 (continued). 
  GDP-share (market size as percentage of GDP) 
  Publishing  
Theatrical 
entertainment Recorded Broad- Video-
  Advertising All Books Newspapers  All Cinema music casting games
1870 0.25  (0.10)        
1880 0.32  (0.10)   1.05     
1890 0.38 0.51 (0.11)   1.06     
1900 0.46 0.79 0.13 0.44  1.04  (0.02)   
1910 0.63 0.91 0.13 0.51  1.03 (0.16) (0.03)   
1920 0.52 0.91 0.16 0.48  0.94 (0.43) (0.04)   
1930 1.15 1.30 0.19 0.73  1.32 (0.93) 0.11 0.03  
1938 1.07 1.17 0.18 0.65  1.18 0.75 0.02 0.08  
1950 0.77 1.08    1.33 0.79 0.04 0.09  
1960 1.24 0.97 0.20 0.52  0.72 0.24 0.10 0.21  
1970 1.07 0.89 0.17 0.50   0.11 0.13 0.38  
1980 1.10 0.77 0.20    0.06 0.18 0.34 0.01
1990 1.39 0.82 0.25 0.38   0.03 0.23 0.56 0.03
2000 1.43 0.62 0.21 0.27   0.06 0.21 0.80 0.10
2010 1.07 0.48 0.15    0.07 0.08 0.80 0.14
Notes: GDP-share is the (gross) consumer expenditure as share of GDP. 
St / So = market size of final year over market size of initial year 
CAGR = compound annual growth rate 
peak year = the year in which the GDP-share of the industry was at its zenith 
Values of £100m and above have been rounded to the nearest £10 million. Real market size and GDP deflated using the long-run retail price index series from Officer (2013). 
These values are estimates based on the available evidence for each particular industry, based on the sources quoted below, and should be seen as an approximate long-run indication. Especially 
for long-run series they do not always come from the same sources and may not be strictly comparable. 
In some cases it was not possible to get the exact decadal year because data could not be traced for that year or was incomparable to other years. For 1880, theatrical entertainment is for 1881; for 
1890 theatrical entertainment and publishing are for 1889; for 1920, broadcasting is for 1923; for 1960, advertising and theatrical entertainment are for 1959; for 1970 books and newspapers are for 
1969; for 1990, newspapers are for 1992; for 2000, newspapers are for 1998. 
The music series is based on figure 3. The estimates for film for 1910-1930 have been made using a growth index based on the growth in the number of cinema seats recorded by London County 
Council for 1911-1929 (after having established that the growth of all seats closely follows real amusement expenditure growth as reported by Prest (1954) and Stone (1966)); using total UK cinema 
expenditure as reported by the US Department of Commerce (1916); and, finally, using the growth of released negative length since 1910.  
The estimates for books for 1870-1910 have been made using the average share of books in publishing in the Stone (1966) series in the early 1920s, and linking this to the Prest (1954) series, and 
the total retail value of books produced minus the value of exports as reported in Weedon (2003). 
Broadcasting expenditure includes BBC license fee income, advertising expenditure and, from 1990, subscription television expenditure. 
Sources: Annual Abstracts of Statistics; Bakker (2011b); British Phonographic Industry Association; EMI Archives; Entertainment Retailers Association Yearbooks; Fletcher (2008); Henry (1986); 
House of Lords (2010); Levi (1882); Mitchell (1988); Monopoly and Mergers Commission (1995); Nevett (1982); Performing Rights Society; Ofcom; Prest (1954); Publishers Association; Stone 
(1966); U. S. Commissioner of Labor Survey (1890); Weedon (2003). 
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Even though in most industries GDP-shares eventually declined, the absolute 
size of the market–except for cinema–did not. A striking example was the 
recorded music market, which after its implosion in the 2000s was still about 5 
times its 1930 size, even though its GDP-share was about the same as in 
1930. Over the measured intervals, the factor by which the market grew 
varied from 3.4 times for all spectator entertainment to 25 times for 
videogames, and a whopping 154 times for broadcasting (Table 2). This 
shows that there was a substantial potential to realise economies of scale. 
Time and again a new media industry emerged, while old media 
remained, but lost in relative importance. The media industry in 2010 had far 
more submarkets, and far more distribution capacity than had been the case 
in 1870. 
 
 
4.1 The case of publishing 
One of the oldest modern media industries is publishing. In 1870 a large book, 
magazine, and newspaper publishing industry already existed (Feather 2006). 
Book exports had increased from 0.2m kilograms in 1828 to 3.1m kilograms 
by 1868, an annual increase of seven percent, and since then the value of 
book exports deflated by the retail price index increased by three percent per 
annum until 1898, when they were £1.3m in current pounds (Weedon 2003: 
187-91). A household expenditure survey of 1889-1890 suggests that £7.4m, 
or 0.5 % of GDP, was spent on ‘reading’. Books were sold outright or could be 
borrowed from libraries, often commercial or non-profit circulation libraries. 
New types of printing presses made cheaper and mass-printing possible, and 
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quality was increased at the end of the nineteenth century by the possibility of 
printing photographs, and some time later by the ability to add colour. Prices 
came down substantially. The real price of paper, for example, decreased by 
2.6 percent per annum between 1866 and 1906 (Weedon 2003: 66-7). 
Urbanisation and transportation innovation made rapid, cheaper, and wider 
distribution possible. 
During the nineteenth century, the number of editions and the copies 
per edition increased gradually. Between 1846 and 1916 book production 
quadrupled, print runs doubled and prices halved. The number of copies 
printed increased from 9 to 35 million, an average annual increase of 2.0 
percent. The current retail value of output increased from £2.7m in 1866 to 
£5.7m in 1906 and £7.4 million in 1916 (Weedon 2003: 55). In 1911, about 
1,250 first editions of fiction for adults were published in Britain, as well as 950 
reprints. The number reached about 2,000 first editions and 2,900 reprints in 
1935, which comes down to an average annual growth of 3.4 % in the number 
of published editions—which does not, of course, necessarily reflect the 
growth in the number of copies sold. Over the same period editions of all 
classes of books grew from 8,500 first editions and 2,400 reprints in 1911 to 
11,500 first editions and 5,000 reprints in 1935, an average annual growth 
rate of 1.8 % (McAleer, 1992). Books’ GDP-share only peaked in 1992 at 0.3 
%, which might not be unrelated to the growth in average education levels.  
Real expenditure on newspapers increased on average by 3.4 % per 
year between 1900 and 1938, and expenditure on books and periodicals grew 
at the same rate (Table 2). Between 1900 and 1919, the number of copies 
sold per 100,000 inhabitants, grew by 2.7 % annually, on average, while real 
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prices remained nearly unchanged. Relative to GDP, the newspaper market 
reached a peak in 1916, at 0.8 % of GDP. 
The market for books, newspapers and periodicals as a whole grew 
rapidly until 1907, then stabilised until 1920, and then increased steadily until 
1933, after which it slowly declined. After the war, the market showed steady 
long-run growth. The GDP-share increased until 1932 to 1.4 % and then 
gradually decreased to 0.7 % in 1998. Nevertheless, the market size in 1998 
was almost three times the 1932 market size, suggesting that the industry 
must have benefited from substantial scale effects, even with a declining 
GDP-share.  
 
 
4.2 The case of recorded music 
Besides audiovisual entertainment, other media also experienced substantial 
productivity growth through adopting radical innovations. Here we will discuss 
the case of the recorded music industry in more detail.8 From the 1890s, 
recording and playing back music through the phonograph or the 
gramophone, made music tradeable and created the modern music industry 
(Bakker 2006, 2011b). The British Gramophone Company, which would later 
become part of EMI, was one of the industry’s leading firms, and one of the 
largest firms in the world as well, manufacturing players and records in many 
countries (Jones 1985). The industry’s further development has been shaped 
by a succession of new products. In the 1920s radio arrived, providing both a 
complement and substitute for records, in the 1930s jukeboxes were 
                                                 
8 Outside of recorded music, piano manufacturing and sheet music publishing were among the fastest growing industries during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. See Ehrlich (1990) and Carnevali and Newton (2013). 
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introduced, and in the 1940s the LP and the EP, merging into one compatible 
standard in 1952. In the 1950s audiotape was introduced, succeeded by 
audiocassettes from the 1960s. The 1980s started with the worst record sales 
slump since the 1930s, which was ended with the introduction of the compact 
disc, which started a new boom. In the late 1990s, MP-3 files supplied through 
the internet became increasing popular, and in the 2000s, internet distribution 
was gradually becoming the standard. A myriad of smaller innovations, such 
as stereo-records, Dolby noise reduction and quadraphonic sound were 
introduced along the way. 
The music industry’s GDP-share has been low, far lower than that of film. It 
was about 0.1 per cent of GDP in 1930, and then sank to 0.02 per cent during 
the depression years (Figure 4). By the late 1950s it had reached 0.1 per cent 
again, and during the early 1970s it reached an all-time high of 0.29 per cent 
of GDP. It then declined to about 0.18 per cent during the 1980s depression, 
but was pushed up again by the advent of the CD, reaching 0.28 per cent in 
1987. By 2010 its share at retail value had sunk to 0.08 per cent. In part this 
might reflect a sharp jump in total factor productivity (TFP) in the industry 
because of the adoption of digital downloads. In 2010, 25 per cent of retail 
music sales by value was downloaded; distribution and manufacturing costs 
were considerably less for digital downloads. However, efficiency gains were 
constrained by the extent to which costs in physical distribution systems were 
fixed. Yet, the average annual real price decline of 9.8 per cent a year since 
2001 shows that efficiency gains had been realised, whether through lower 
costs or lower margins. 
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Figure 4. Expenditure on recorded music, in millions of 2010 pounds and as percentage of 
GDP, 1930-2010. 
 
Note: rough estimates were made for 1900-1920 using the growth of the annual UK sales 
series of the HMV, Zonophone and Twin record labels for 1905-1930, deflated by the Retail 
Price Index and linking this to the 1930 national expenditure. Consumer expenditure for 1988 
to 1997 was estimated based on trade deliveries using the relationship of the latter with 
consumer expenditure for the years 1978-1986 and 1998-2006. 
Sources: “The demand for Gramophone records. A review of Gramophone record sales 
between the years 1905 and 1951,” Controller's Department - Economics Section, 1 August 
1952; Managing Director Minutes, and “Statistics mailed to Statistical Department,” EMI 
Archives, London; British Phonographic Industry Association; Entertainment Retailers 
Association Yearbooks. 
 
 
The long-run growth pattern thus shows a sharp slump between 1930 and 
1939, an almost continuous medium-term increase between 1940 and 1973, 
stagnation between 1973 and 1985, sharp growth from 1985 till about 1992, 
stabilisation between 1992 and 2001, and sharp decline since 2001. Yet in 
terms of quantity, UK consumers probably consume more music per capita 
than they ever did before. 
 Comparing the real expenditure and GDP-share figures reveals an 
important pattern that we see in some other media industries as well: while 
the GDP-share of music in 2008 was about the same as in 1930, the absolute 
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expenditure was about three times as much. This matters very much for 
media industries, because most costs were fixed and / or sunk. The three 
times larger market size in 2008 could thus allow higher sunk outlays, either 
on more diversity or on a higher perceived quality per product. 
 The music business model involved playing lots of music on radio, 
especially after 1952 when most other radio programming moved to 
television, and this probably was an important factor in the reanimation of the 
music industry in the mid-1950s (Bakker 2006; 2011b). Radio stations had 
more airtime for music, and also could cater to more diverse musical tastes. In 
the 1930s, in addition the British record company Decca pioneered the juke 
box model of selling music; this business model allowed it to make substantial 
profits in an age when music expenditure was minimal, combined with 
releasing the lowest-priced records for only existing stars (‘leading artists, low 
prices’). It made Decca a large music firm in the US and in Britain, where it 
broke the near-monopoly of EMI. It was forced to sell its US subsidiary during 
the war, starting a gradual but long-run decline and marginalisation, until it 
was sold to PolyGram in 1979. Had it been allowed to keep its US assets the 
outcome might have been very different. Another business model in the 1930s 
was the hit songs based on films; although research on this for Britain has still 
to be done, these were a very large share of the best-selling records in the 
US. 
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4.3 The case of broadcasting 
Throughout its history, broadcasting grew remarkably, with an unprecedented 
6.3 % average real revenue growth per annum from its inception in 1923 
(Table 2). In the early 1920s the BBC monopoly on radio broadcasting was 
established. According to Tunstall (1983: 46-49), between 1922 and 1939 the 
BBC had learnt the habit of deference to four key ‘veto groups’ that could 
threaten its monopoly: the major political parties, the press, engineers, and 
the London cultural establishment. The BBC did not offer advertising, 
according to some not to antagonise the press, and many companies 
advertised on French and Luxembourg radio stations that became popular in 
Britain. Other countries tried different forms of broadcasting regulation. The 
United States allowed commercial broadcasting while the Netherlands 
allocated all air-time to four large and several smaller non-profit organisations 
representing cultural and social streams in society, and from 1968 introduced 
free entry and exit, in which foundations could compete for airspace through 
their number of members, and also, since 2006, through product quality. 
 Between 1936 and 1939 the BBC broadcast television from London to 
about 10,000 television sets. After the war the broadcasts resumed and in 
1955 a second television channel, ITV, was made available for commercial 
broadcasters, who could bid for a regional franchise and had to fulfil some 
public service requirements in their programming and offer a joint news 
service. Several times since, the franchises have been put up for bids again. 
In 1964 a second BBC channel was added, and in 1982 a second public 
broadcaster, Channel 4, which was non-profit but sold advertising through ITV 
and focused on innovative and minority programming not offered by other 
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channels. The 1980s also saw the rise of cable and satellite channels. By the 
early 1990s the BSkyB company had become an important subscriber based 
satellite service. In 1997, the fifth terrestrial channel, Channel 5 was added. 
 Since the 1980s several important shifts have taken place. First, 
television production changed from in-house production to commissioning 
from independent producers. Channel 4’s remit was to use only external 
production companies, and from 1990 the BBC and ITV were required to 
source at least 25 % of programming from outside. The independent sector 
boomed, as did Britain’s television exports. Pearson Television became a 
leading exporter of game shows and game show formats, and BBC World 
Wide, owned by the BBC, became Britain’s main global television exporter, 
exporting many outside television programmes as well, and also venturing in 
adjacent business such as magazines and travel guides. Endemol 
Entertainment, Pearson’s main international competitor in game shows, and 
maker of Big Brother, came from the Netherlands, where a similar focus on 
outsourcing by public broadcasters had existed for longer, and many export-
oriented  companies had emerged. 
 Second, prime time programming changed remarkably, from mainly 
American series in the mid-1970s, to almost exclusively British content by the 
2000s.  
 Third, subscriptions became a new revenue source, and eventually 
grew bigger than either license fee or advertising, constituting 41 percent of all 
television revenue by 2010. Cable and satellite broadcasting made exclusion 
possible, and thus subscriptions. Subscription revenues were also more 
recession proof, as they fell less during recessions than advertising, as 
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viewers' opportunity costs declined. Subscription television also made content 
less focused on the lowest common denominator and more specialised, as 
each subscriber needed to like only one programme enough to renew the 
subscription, rather than that the audience per programme needed to be 
maximised for advertisers.  
 Broadcasting appears to have been the fastest growing industry in the 
long-run, on average growing 2.5 times faster than GDP for 85 years (Table 
2). Regulation probably kept the industry artificially small during early years, 
while the possibility of exclusion through subscription television drove growth 
in later years. 
The key reason for direct intervention in broadcasting was probably 
remedying perceived market failure, followed by protecting indigenous culture 
and perhaps trade promotion and propaganda, through for example, the 
imperial broadcasting services and later BBC World and services like BBC 
Persian. 
 
 
5. The impact of media industries on the aggregate economy 
Health care is extremely important to consumers, but also has a concomitant 
large and growing GDP-share—it is often argued to be one of the prime 
examples of ‘Baumol’s disease’ we discussed earlier. In contrast, because of 
the radical industrialisations discussed above that passed almost unnoticed 
and yet massively increased media productivity, media’s aggregate GDP-
share has hardly grown since the 1930s. However, many people, like the 
organisers of the Olympic Games, intuitively sense that media industries are 
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far more important than their tiny GDP-shares suggest. This section will 
explore how we can explain this gap between perceived importance and 
GDP-share. Below we will discuss welfare reflected in opportunity costs; 
consumer expectations and aspirations; effects on market functioning through 
information transmission, the shaping of morals and advertising; education; 
and finally, the effect on the process of institutional change. 
 
 
5.1 Time is money 
The first channel through which media industries affected the aggregate 
economy was through their high opportunity costs. The large amount of time 
that consumers spent consuming media and entertainment products implied 
that the welfare impact of these products was much larger than their GDP-
share suggested. Goolsbee and Klenow (2006) showed that the value of the 
time used to consume or use products can be used to proxy the welfare 
effects of these goods.  
Take, for example, the price of cinema tickets. Although the money 
consumers spent per hour on watching movies decreased, the value of an 
hour increased enormously, making the share of movies in GDP weighted by 
their full costs (price plus opportunity costs in the form of lost wages) increase 
(Bakker 2009). In 1934, for example, the price of a film ticket was 4 pence 
(£2.05 in today’s money) and now it is £5.18, a growth of one percent per 
year, while real wages grew 1.8 % annually. In 1934 the full cost of a 2.5-hour 
cinema visit was the £2.05 ticket price and 2.5 hours times an average hourly 
wage of  £3.39, resulting in a full cost of £10.53, while today the full cost is 
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£5.18 ticket price and 2.5 hours times average hourly earnings of £12.77 
resulting in a full cost of £37.11—a growth of 1.7 % annually (Bakker 2010a). 
Eighty percent of the growth in real full costs was driven by opportunity costs 
increases, the wage increases in the above calculation. If these reflected 
welfare changes perfectly, welfare grew almost twice as fast as price over 
those 75 years. 
Including films on DVD and television, consumers spent 7551 million 
hours watching films in 2008, 2.4 % of available time for work and leisure and 
3.7 % of available leisure time. Expenditure was just 0.3 % of GDP. This 
suggests that films were about 8 to12 times more important to consumers 
than their GDP-share would suggest. Cash expenditure on films was £3.7 
billion, total opportunity costs – what viewers could have earned working 
instead of watching films, was £96 billion (7551 million hrs * £12.77/hr). The 
average price per hour was roughly £0.49, which compares to a 1934 price of 
£0.82, a decline of 0.7 % per annum. Average full costs per hour were £13.20, 
which compares to £4.21 in 1934, an increase of 1.7 % annually. 
 Products that claimed time from consumers in which they could hardly 
do something else, such as cinema and live entertainment and to a lesser 
extent videogames, books, newspapers and magazines, had the highest 
opportunity costs and therefore perhaps also the highest welfare impact. 
 
 
5.2 Expectations and aspirations 
A second channel through which media industries made a direct welfare 
impact was through the media’s effect on consumers’ life expectations and 
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aspirations. Cinema, radio, television and the internet and the coincidental 
advertising, showed consumers new possibilities and so increased both their 
ambitions and expectations. One could speculate whether increased 
expectations because of television played a role in the alleged near-
stagnation of ‘happiness’ in Britain since the 1950s (Layard 2011; see also 
chapter 5). Nevertheless, it is very difficult to say anything about this. The 
happiness surveys generally have an upper limit, so happy respondents 
cannot get happier over time and the responses are not intersubjectively 
comparable, unlike income. The concept of capability might be more useful 
(Sen 1999), as it is objectively measurable and takes into account what 
people can actually do; it can, for example, explain the difference between 
happy humans and happy cats. For a penetrating critique of happiness 
studies and of attempts to measure happiness see McCloskey (2012:16-23). 
 
 
5.3 Market functioning 
A third channel through which media industries affected the aggregate 
economy was by influencing the way markets functioned. We will discuss 
information transmission, moral conditioning, and advertising in turn. First, the 
telegraph, news agencies, newspapers, magazines, radio, television and 
social media improved the speed and quality of information transmission 
within the British economy (Bakker 2011a; Kaukiainen 2001). Incidentally, 
Britain also became a large exporter of information, with news agencies in the 
2000s exporting about fifteen times more than Britain imported. The 
disadvantage was that better and faster information transmission also 
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increased self-feedback influencing opportunities (herd behaviour) as well as 
opportunities for manipulation (Soros 2000). 
Present day studies in finance suggest that news media affected the 
movement of financial markets, although the magnitude of the effect differed 
substantially. It also remains the question to what extent media reporting 
generated  self-feedback effects, or self-reinforcing herd behaviour. Some 
authors, such as Robert Shiller (2009), argue that there was a substantial 
effect of the media in instigating bubbles, while other authors find the obverse. 
Campbell et al. (2012), for example, find that press coverage did not feed the 
British railway mania in the 1840s, and Bhattacharya et al.  (2009), find that 
media reporting played only a very limited role in the internet bubble of the 
1990s. Longitudinal studies for the twentieth century show that during crises, 
the financial markets were far more sensitive to media reports, both of reports 
containing new information and of more ‘persuasive’ reports only increasing 
exposure of a particular stock (Tetlock 2007; Garcia 2013; Engelberg and 
Parsons 2011; Bakker 2014b). 
A second way in which media industries improved market functioning 
was by reducing transaction costs through stringent informal production codes 
and conventions, possibly affecting and conditioning the morals of market 
participants by showing them simulated worlds with examples of acceptable 
behaviour, and thus decreasing opportunism and dishonesty in transactions. 
Without a production code, the obverse was also possible. In the words of 
Margaret Atwood (2012:69), “Are narratives a means to enforce social control 
or a means of escape from it?” In addition, Pinker (2011) argues that the 
novel and other nineteenth century fictional forms allowed a person to better 
Soft power: the media industries in Britain since 1870,ch. Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Gerben Bakker, LSE, 19-12-2013, p. 40 of 54 
 40
imagine other persons’ points of view, and thus reduced violence. In the 
1930s a screenwriter for Gaumont-British, for example, noted many types of 
stories that could not be filmed in Britain because of moral concerns.  Modern 
neuroscience experiments have shown that, based on the fictional cues of a 
stage or a film, the human brain builds a simulation that leaves out all the 
imperfections and gets into a hypnotic state of complete absorption and loss 
of self-reference, which is not inconsistent with media enabling virtual social 
experimentation and moral conditioning (Frazzetto 2012). 
In addition, the mere replacement of activities with negative 
externalities by media consumption reduced transaction costs. The 
temperance movement in nineteenth century Britain, for example, saw 
‘rational recreation’ as a way to reduce drinking and other vices, and in the US 
in the 1990s and 2000s, the screening of violent movies significantly reduced 
violent crimes and alcohol consumption on the evening of the screening and 
the night afterwards, with no intertemporal substitution for at least three weeks 
after (Dahl and Dellavigna 2009). 
A third way in which the media and creative industries affected market 
functioning was through enabling new forms of advertising. New media 
technologies, in combination with advertising, had an important influence on 
competition and market structure in consumer goods industries. Radio and 
television were especially suited to persuasive brand advertising rather than 
price advertising. In some industries, such as frozen food, soups and shaving 
materials, changes in advertising may have increased concentration, because 
leading brands could advertise and get a larger market share; in other 
industries, such as contact lenses, advertising may have increased price 
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competition and in that way increased industrial concentration (Sutton 1991). 
The advent of full colour magazine advertising, cinema advertising, and the 
absence of radio and television advertising until late in the period had 
important effects on market structure in these industries. 
 
 
5.4 Education 
A fourth channel through which the media industries affected the wider 
economy was through their role in education. Through publishing and 
educational television they supported education directly, but they also 
educated consumers indirectly. Taylor (1976: 181), for example, noted that 
“The cinema was the greatest educative force of the early twentieth century. 
Yet highly educated people saw in it only vulgarity and the end of old 
England.” 
 
 
5.5 Shaping the means for institutional change 
Finally, the fifth channel through which the media industries affected the 
aggregate economy was by shaping the means for institutional change. The 
main media affecting social action were publishing, live, radio, television and 
online social media, and to a far lesser extent, music, films, books and 
videogames. Initially, the potential danger of media was considered so great 
that, before the 1840s, only a few theatres were licensed to stage plays. The 
Belgian revolution of 1848 actually started in a theatre. Paradoxically, until 
1968, a year full of media-covered social unrest, every play performed in 
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Britain was preventatively censored by the Government. In the nineteenth 
century newspapers and magazines helped people to organise for political 
causes. At the same time, the media may sometimes also have moderated 
the pace of institutional change and prevented radical turns by increasing 
empathy. Bismarck, for example, famously remarked that Britain would never 
have ideological socialists because horse-racingwhich brought classes 
togetherwas so popular (Steinberg 2011: 373; Evans 2012). During the 
twentieth century radio and television became important, and eventually the 
internet helped people to form new primary action groups.9   
The political scientist Joseph Nye (2004) argues that states use media 
as a ‘soft power’ to stimulate institutional change in other countries, soft power 
being instead of ‘something that could be dropped on your foot or on cities’, 
‘something that might change your mind about wanting to drop anything in the 
first place’. In the 1960s, for example, South African Prime Minister Hendrik 
Verwoerd ‘more or less put TV in a category with atomic bombs and poison 
gas’, and when in 1971 South Africa discussed whether to finally allow 
television, the former minister of post and telegraphs argued that it ‘would 
lead to the demoralisation of South African civilization and the destruction of 
apartheid.’10 In the 1980s a monument in Prague for John Lennon became a 
rallying point for demonstrations for peace and democracy and calls for the 
removal of Soviet troops. As Nye notes, eventually ‘Lennon trumped Lenin’.  
Nye argues that Britain used soft power deliberately since at least the 
interwar period and that the BBC’s international services and popular music 
such as the Beatles and the Rolling Stones were important contributors to 
                                                 
9 Primary action groups are ‘decision-making units’ that ‘govern the process of arrangemental innovation’ that leads to new institutions, law and regulations. 
See North and Davis (1971:8). 
10 Time 20 November 1964, p. 40; Nye (2004: 51, 2012: 82). 
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institutional change elsewhere in the world. In the 2000s, France, Russia and 
China followed the British and American soft power examples and started 
their own 24-hour English broadcasting channels. 
  
Comparing how media and creative industries improved short-term and long-
term market functioning through their effect on information transmission, 
morals, market structure and institutional change (channels three and four 
above) shows that only radio, television and online social media each had all 
four effects, perhaps underlining how powerful and new these media were to 
what came before them, and how large and multidimensional their effect has 
been on the British economy between 1870 and 2010. Research on an earlier 
era corroborates the large impact new media had: it finds that European cities 
that adopted the printing press in the late fourteenth century, grew between 
twenty and eighty percent more than comparable cities over the next century, 
controlling for all else (Dittmar 2011).  
At least from Roman Britain onwards, externalities such as those 
discussed above have been used to justify public intervention in the media 
industry. To this intervention we now turn. 
 
 
6. Policy towards media industries  
Although the process of industrialisation described above was pervasive 
throughout the media industries, it was not unconstrained; during our long 
twentieth century, policy modulated the inevitable forces of industrialisation, 
leading to different outcomes in different industries. Those that experienced a 
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high degree of intervention were live entertainment, film, radio and television. 
Key reasons for policy intervention included raising fiscal revenue, protecting 
indigenous culture, remedying market failure, protecting the balance of 
payments, kick-starting path-dependent agglomeration benefits, and, finally, 
trade promotion and propaganda. The tools to achieve these objectives 
included the shaping of general industry infrastructure, safety and standard 
regulations, special taxes, indirect intervention and, finally, direct intervention 
(Bakker 2010b). We will not give a detailed description of the history of policy 
in every media industry, for which other works can be consulted. Instead, we 
will juxtapose the sharp policy intervention in the film industry with a near-
absence of that in the recorded music business. 
 
 
6.1 The case of the film industry 
Raising fiscal revenue was one of the first objectives for intervention in the 
film industry. In 1916, the Entertainment Tax was introduced, charging 
between a 25-50 % tax on film and live entertainment tickets. The latter had 
lower rates, thus increasing the relative price of film tickets. The tax was only 
abolished in 1960, after a sharp decline in the number of cinemas. The 
various film production tax breaks introduced since the late 1970s also were 
partially meant to raise fiscal revenue, by shifting foreign expenditures into 
Britain.  
 Protecting indigenous culture became a main objective in the mid-
1920s, when British film production almost ceased. The Film Quota Act (1927) 
was introduced, and led to a production boom (figure 5). The Act was  
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Figure 5 The number of feature films produced in Britain, 1912-2008. 
 
Notes: ET = Entertainment Tax; NFFC = National Film Finance Corporation. 
Source: British Film Institute, Film Council Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
renewed in 1936, and quotas were finally abolished in 1983 (Sedgwick 1994, 
1997). While Britain considered direct intervention in the film industry, it did do 
so only in 1949 with the founding of the Film Finance Corporation and the 
Eady Levy, a levy on cinema tickets to finance British-based production. 
Protecting culture was also an important reason for the various tax breaks 
since the 1970s. 
Remedying market failure was also important. The Cinematograph Act 
(1909), for example, led to an investment boom, as it made insuring cinemas 
easier and increased confidence of investors by reducing information 
asymmetry (Miskell 2005). The 1927 quota act also countered market failure. 
Hollywood studios dominated British screens. In 1948 the existence of 
collusion was corroborated by the US Supreme Court, which found the 
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Hollywood studios guilty of collusion and asked them to divest their cinemas 
and abolish some business practices. The U.S. Webb-Pommerene Act, 
however, still allowed American firms to collude in foreign markets by forming 
export cartels.  
In exhibition, British policy to remedy market failure seems to have 
been decidedly unsuccessful. In the 1980s, for example, the Monopoly and 
Mergers Commission concluded that competition was lacking in film 
exhibition, but that nothing could be done. Yet a few years later foreign new 
entrants, such as the French UCG and the American Warner Cinemas and 
MGM Cinemas, engaged the incumbents with new multiplex cinemas (Bakker 
2010a).  
 Another policy objective, protecting the balance of payments, became 
important in the 1940s. Britain had a substantial dollar ‘shortage’, and the 
Bank of England put strict limits on what Hollywood studios could remit back 
to the United States. Remittances grew from £7 million and £10 million in 
unregulated 1938 and 1939 to between £4.8 and £8.5 million annually in 
1940-1943, under restrictive regulation. In 1943, when regulation was lifted, 
the remittances ballooned to £26.5 million, and between 1944 and 1946 they 
were between £15 and £17 million per annum, around 4 % of all dollar imports 
(Annual abstract of Statistics, various years; Dickinson and Street 1985:179; 
Dickinson 1983: 76; Tunstall 1983:63). In 1947, the Treasury taxed 
remittances at 75 %, which led to a Hollywood boycott. In the end the controls 
were lifted, and Hollywood started producing a substantial number of films in 
Britain (Tunstall 1983: 63-67). Classics such as Bridge on the River Kwai and 
Lawrence of Arabia were supported by the Film Finance Corporation, founded 
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in 1949, and partially meant to protect the balance of payments by 
encouraging American firms to produce in Britain. Since at least the 1960s, 
when data becomes available, Britain has been a net exporter of films every 
single year. 
 Agglomeration benefits were another policy objective. The idea was to 
protect an industry until it reached a critical mass and would benefit from 
Marshallian external economies of scale, knowledge spill-overs and labour 
market pooling. The 1927 quota act was meant to create a self-sustaining 
agglomeration of British film companies, viable when the Act expired. Many 
new companies were founded, and many Hollywood studios opened British 
production subsidiaries (Bakker 2010b). Yet the Act had to be renewed when 
it expired, and quotas remained in place until 1983. Almost all policy tools 
probably included some intended stimulation of agglomeration benefits. The 
tax breaks since the 1970s were certainly intended to achieve a critical mass 
of film production. General cultural policies such as training, film schools, 
universities, the founding of the British Film Institute, of course helped as well. 
 Another policy objective was trade promotion and propaganda. During 
the drafting of the 1927 Act, the promotion of British goods and services was 
specifically mentioned, and it was widely felt that films would help British 
industry. As The Economist, wrote in 1937: “Trade follows the film.” British 
cultural exports may also have added ‘soft power’ to Britain’s international 
strategy and its efforts to assemble and retain allies.11  
 
 
                                                 
11 See the discussion on soft power in the previous section. 
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6.2 Why direct intervention in film but not in recorded music? 
In contrast to film, the British music industry experienced little intervention. 
Five economic reasons can explain why it was better able to withstand foreign 
competition, and three historical reasons why it was more difficult to organise 
public support for intervention in the recorded music industry.  
In economic terms, first, consumer preferences in music were more 
horizontal than vertical, meaning that a few songs could not steal away sales 
of all other songs. Second, while doubling a film budget easily increased 
perceived quality, doubling the budget for a song would not necessarily have 
the same effect. Third, entry costs in music production decreased: from the 
1980s almost anybody could produce a record from their home. Fourth, entry 
in music distribution was far easier than entry into film distribution, and fifth, 
music preferences were more local than film preferences: many American 
songs were not directly imported, but used as inputs for British cover versions 
(Tennent and Gourvish 2010). 
Historically, first, British film production almost ceased in mid-1920s, 
giving powerful support for protection. The British recorded music industry 
never experienced such a fate. Second, between the 1930s and the 1960s 
EMI dominated music production and distribution with a 50-80 % market 
share and huge royalty imports, causing less balance of payment problems 
than film, and the forced sale of Decca’s US assets brought in a substantial 
amount of dollars. Third, radio became an important way to distribute music, 
and was controlled by the BBC monopoly, probably making intervention more 
difficult. 
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7. Conclusion 
We have investigated three questions: how new media industries arose and 
old industries changed in Britain since 1870, which tendencies drove their 
evolution, and what impact they had on the rest of the economy. First, we 
have shown how the emergence of new media industries in Britain can be 
seen as a series of industrialisations that automated and standardised 
entertainment and made it more easily tradeable, how this improved 
productivity, and how the latter enabled Britain to capitalise on its comparative 
advantage in entertainment. 
Second, we showed how four economic tendencies shaped the 
evolution of each of the media industries. The importance of endogenous 
sunk costs triggered quality races, which hampered the British film industry 
during the 1920s and since the 1970s, but helped its music industry since the 
mid-1950s. Marginal revenues equalling marginal profits induced vertical 
integration, leading to a dominance of vertically integrated companies in 
several British media industries, such as J. Arthur Rank in the film industry, 
EMI in the music industry, and the BBC in public broadcasting. Quasi-public 
good characteristics, media being a toll good, led to exclusion-focused 
business models and the prospering of superstars, helping to understand 
commercial television’s reliance on advertising before cable, and the 
importance of stadium-sized live events for superstars’ income. Finally, the 
project-based nature of media production stimulated agglomeration in several 
industries. Books, magazine, and newspaper publishing and news agencies 
had traditionally been centred in London, and the film, television, recorded 
music and surviving live entertainment industries have located there as well. 
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Videogame development, however, became more widespread throughout 
Britain.  
Third, we showed how the media industries had a far larger impact on 
the British economy than their GDP-share would suggest. Because of the 
opportunity costs they involved, they increased total welfare by far more than 
prices would suggest - in one example, films, about twice as much. More 
effective information transmission and conditioning of morals that lowered 
transaction costs improved the functioning of markets at the cross-sections. 
Advertising and communication had important longitudinal effects on market 
functioning. The former, by allowing increases in concentration, the latter by 
facilitating collective action and institutional change that could change the way 
the market functioned. Media also affected human capital formation, through 
their role in education, as well as consumers’ expectations and aspirations.  
We have seen how policy intervention modulated the effects of the 
unstoppable forces of industrialisation. In film and television intervention was 
the strongest, in music, publishing and videogames substantially lower. One 
could speculate whether policy that would have been friendlier towards new 
media would have allowed Britain to capitalise better on its distinctive 
capabilities in entertainment. Without a cinema-biased entertainment tax, 
without the forced divestment of Decca’s foreign assets, without a monopoly 
in public broadcasting, British media industries might have done slightly 
better. General policies might also have helped: had competition policy 
remedied the situation in cinemas, the film market might have been larger with 
better screen-access for independent films; had education policy been more 
proactive the workforce might have been better educated; and had backward 
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industrial practices been abolished more quickly the industry might have been 
more effective. A pessimist might comment that this case once again 
demonstrates that the reasons for Britain’s over-all underperformance 
compared to the United States and Europe lay not in what it did in its long-
existing industries, but in the inability of its economy - through deficient 
competition policy, backward industrial practices and under-education – to 
switch resources more rapidly and effectively to sectors in which it did have a 
strong comparative advantage.  
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